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CRIMINAL LAW - PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OBTAINED

AS A RESULT OF UNWARNED, VOLUNTARY
STATEMENT HELD ADMISSIBLE DESPITE FAILURE
TO ISSUE MIRANDA WARNINGS - UNITED STATES v.
PATANE, 124 S. CT. 2620 (2004)
The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the
government from compelling individuals to testify against themselves in
criminal proceedings.1 Courts have interpreted this clause as rendering
statements of persons in custody inadmissible in their criminal proceedings, absent a prior warning of their constitutional right and a voluntary,
informed waiver.2 In United States v. Patane,3 the Supreme Court declined
to extend this exclusionary principle to instances where police have obtained physical evidence as a result of an unwarned, voluntary statement.4
Samuel Patane was indicted for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a violation of federal law 5, as a result of two independent investigations by the Colorado Springs Police Department.6 The police had

...

1 U.S CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment states, in pertinent part, "No person
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Id.
2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966). Statements taken or co-

erced from criminal defendants during a custodial interrogation, in the absence of a full
warning of their constitutional rights, violate the Self-Incrimination clause and are inadmissible in criminal proceedings. Id. To admit statements from an interrogation into evidence
at a criminal proceeding, authorities must warn those in custody that they have the right to
remain silent, that any statements they make can be used as evidence against them in trial,
and that they have the right to consultation with an attorney prior to the interrogation. Id.
A person may only waive these rights if it is done voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
Id.
' 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004).
4 Id. at 2626 (noting Self-Incrimination clause not implicated by allowing physical
fruit of a voluntary statement).
5 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2004). Section 922(g)(1) provides that "it shall be unlawful
for any person who has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year ... to possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition." Id.
6 United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013, 1014 (10th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 124 S. Ct.
2620 (2004). Patane was under investigation for gun possession and violating a domestic
violence restraining order. Id. at 1015. Officer Fox conducted an interview with Patane's
ex-girlfriend during which she told him that Patane had violated the restraining order, and
that she feared for her life because he always carried a gun. Id. Contemporaneously, Detective Benner received a tip from an ATF agent that Patane possessed a .40 caliber Glock
pistol. Id. Officer Fox and Detective Benner arranged to travel to Patane's house to execute an arrest in connection with the restraining order violation. Id.
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arrested Patane at his house for a violation of a domestic violence restraining order, and had reason to believe he possessed a Glock pistol.7 The
officers attempted to advise Patane of his Miranda rights, but Patane interrupted them by stating that he knew his rights. 8 The officers made no further attempt to complete the Miranda warnings. 9 The officers questioned
Patane about the Glock pistol and he voluntarily responded that he in fact
possessed the weapon, told the officers where they could find the pistol,
and granted them permission to retrieve it.' 0 Patane was subsequently
charged with being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm."
Patane sought to have the firearm suppressed because the officers
did not have sufficient probable cause to arrest Patane for the restraining
order violation, and, in the alternative, because the firearm was the fruit of
an unwamed statement in violation of Patane's Miranda rights. 12 The district court granted Patane's motion to suppress the firearm upon finding
insufficient probable cause to execute the arrest, and declined to rule
whether the firearm should be suppressed as the fruit of an unwarned
statement. 3 The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held
that sufficient probable cause existed to arrest Patane for the violation of
the restraining order, but upheld the suppression of the firearm, stating that
the gun was the physical fruit of a Miranda violation.' 4 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the failure to properly advise a defendant of his Miranda rights requires the suppression of
physical evidence obtained from his unwarned, voluntary statements. 5

7 Patane,304 F.3d at 1015.
8 Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2625. The officers did not get beyond the right to remain

silent before being interrupted by Patane. Id.
9 Id. The Government concedes that any subsequent answers by Patane at his house
would be inadmissible under Miranda. Id. at 2625 n. 1; see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 44445.
10 Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2625.
11 Id.
12 Id.

13 Id. An officer has probable cause to arrest if, under the totality of the circumstances, he learned of facts and circumstances through reasonably trustworthy information
that would lead a reasonable person to believe an offense has been or is being committed by
the person being arrested. Patane, 304 F.3d at 1016 (citing United States v. Morris, 247
F.3d 1080, 1088 (10th Cir. 2002)). The district court stated that domestic disputes often
involve claims and counter-claims between parties who have ended an intimate relationship
and uncorroborated allegations arising from these disputes do not establish probable cause.
Patane,304 F.3d at 1016.
14 Patane, 304 F.3d at 1018-19 (finding probable cause existed for arrest but noting
gun inadmissible because it was fruit of failure to warn).
15 Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2624 (noting Court has previously addressed question without
reaching definitive answer).

CASE COMMENT: 124 S. CT. 2620
In Miranda v. Arizona, 16 the United States Supreme Court held that
under the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Constitution the government
can introduce defendants' incriminating statements into evidence only if
the police have warned criminal defendants of their constitutional rights
prior to the statement. 17 The Court has also held that evidence obtained,
either directly or indirectly, as a result of a constitutional violation must be
suppressed unless the government can show that it learned of the evidence
from an independent source. 18 Courts have used this exclusionary rule,
however, only to suppress evidence obtained through a direct violation of a
defendant's constitutional right, and have not extended it to violations of
mere prophylactic protections of a constitutional right.' 9 Courts have historically viewed Miranda protections as a prophylactic rule rather than a
constitutional rule and therefore have not subjected seized evidence or
statements to the "poisonous fruit" exclusion.2 °
A recent decision declaring the rule in Miranda a constitutional rule
has clouded this historical view of Miranda protections as a prophylactic
rule. 2' This uncertainty created a circuit split on the question of whether
16

384 U.S. 436 (1966).
see also supra note 2 and accompanying text.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-87 (1963) (holding courts must

17 Id. at 444-45;
18 Wong Sun v.

suppress evidence indirectly obtained from unconstitutional conduct in Fourth Amendment
context as fruit of poisonous tree). Provisions that forbid the acquisition of evidence in a
particular way do not merely prevent its use before the court, but rather that the evidence
may not be used at all. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392
(1920). Thus, evidence that comes to light as a result of an unlawful invasion is the fruit of
a poisonous tree and must be suppressed. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 485.
19 See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305-07 (1985) (distinguishing procedural
violation of Miranda rights from Fourth Amendment unlawful searches). The Court stated
that "the purpose of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is to deter unreasonable
searches no matter how probative their fruits." Id. The Miranda exclusionary rule protects
Fifth Amendment rights, but also sweeps more broadly than the Amendment itself. Id. at
306 (noting defendant who gives voluntary, unwarned statement receives Miranda remedy
even in absence of identifiable constitutional harm).
20 See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306; New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) (recognizing Miranda warnings as prophylactic and meant to protect against compulsory selfincrimination and not rights themselves protected by Constitution); Michigan v. Tucker,
417 U.S. 433, 445-46 (1974) (declining to extend "fruits of poisonous tree" doctrine to
suppress evidence obtained from un-Mirandized confession). The Miranda warnings are
prophylactic because they are measures intended to prevent compulsory self-incrimination
in violation of the Fifth Amendment and are not themselves rights protected by the Constitution. Quarles,467 U.S. at 654. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine forbids the use
of evidence obtained directly or indirectly as a result of a violation of a defendant's constitutional rights. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 485 (emphasis supplied).
21 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). In Dickerson, the Court
addressed whether the decision in Miranda constituted an interpretation of judicially created rules of evidence that could therefore be legislatively modified, or whether it was an
interpretation of the Constitution beyond the legislative reach of Congress. See id. at 437.
The Court recognized that language used in opinions analyzing the effect of Miranda sug-
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courts should extend the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine to preclude
evidence obtained from an unwarned, voluntary statement. 22 The classification of Miranda warnings as a prophylactic rule, however, has not been
the sole justification in declining to extend the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine.23 Courts have also focused on differences between the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution, as well as the underlying purpose of the Miranda rule.24
2 5 the Supreme Court considered whether
In United States v. Patane,
the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine should extend to suppress physical evidence discovered as a result of an unwarned, voluntary statement.26
The Court answered this question in the negative stating that the Miranda
rule, which sweeps beyond the actual protections of the Self Incrimination
Clause, should only expand out of necessity to protect the actual right
against self incrimination. 27 Accordingly, the Court stated that the intro-

gested that the rule was not constitutionally based. See id. (noting judicially created exceptions along with references to Miranda as prophylactic rule rather than constitutional right
created confusion). The Court clearly stated that the Miranda rule is a constitutional rule
that may not be superceded legislatively. Id. at 444. Some courts read this as overruling
the Elstad and Tucker holdings by implication because it undermined the reliance on
Miranda warnings as a prophylactic rule. See United States v. Faulkingham, 295 F.3d 85,
92-93 (1 st Cir. 2002) (noting Dickerson holding of Miranda warning as constitutional rule
strengthened argument against admission of physical fruits of Miranda violation.); Patane,
304 F.3d at 1029 (noting Dickerson holding of Miranda warnings as constitutional rule
fundamentally changed analysis of admission of physical fruits of Miranda violation).
22 See United States v. Sterling, 283 F.3d 216, 218-19 (4th Cir. 2002); United States
v. DeSumma, 272 F.3d 176, 180-81 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting physical fruits of Miranda violation never subject to suppression under poisonous fruit doctrine); see also Faulkingham,
295 F.3d at 90-94 (noting physical fruits of Miranda violation sometimes subject to suppression under poisonous fruit doctrine depending on need for deterring police misconduct).
23 See United States v. Villalba-Alvarado, 345 F.3d. 1007, 1015 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting admission of physical fruit of Miranda violation does not offend purpose of Miranda
rule). The Miranda rule was instituted to deter overzealous interrogation techniques by
authorities as well as to prevent the introduction of untrustworthy evidence. See id. at 1015
(citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445-55). The introduction of physical evidence obtained from
an unwarned, voluntary statement does not offend either of these purposes. See VillalbaAlvarado, 345 F.3d at 1015. Additionally, fundamental differences between the Fourth
Amendment and Fifth Amendment affect the practicality of applying the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. See DeSumma, 272 F.3d at 180. The Supreme Court even specifically noted the difference between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments while declaring the
Miranda rule as a constitutional rule. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441. The refusal to extend
the "fruit of poisonous tree" doctrine to Miranda violations did not prove Miranda was a
prophylactic rule, but rather it was the product of the fundamental differences between the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments. See id.
24 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
25 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004).
26 See id. at 2625.

27 Id. at 2627; see also Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 778 (2003) (Souter, J.,
plurality opinion) (requiring "powerful showing" before expanding the privilege against

CASE COMMENT: 124 S. CT. 2620
duction of evidence derived from an unwarned statement did not implicate
the Self Incrimination Clause, and that a blanket suppression rule fails to
serve the goals of the Self-Incrimination Clause and Miranda.28 The Court
also stated that the textual composition of the Self-Incrimination Clause
furthered the presumption against expanding the Miranda rule in this instance. 29 The Court stated that its recent decision declaring Miranda a
constitutional rule did not change any of these observations, and that it did
not invalidate previous decisions limiting the expansion of the Miranda
rule. 30 In an attempt to strengthen its argument, the Court stated that failure to warn a defendant of his Miranda rights does not constitute a constitutional violation in and of itself; rather, a violation occurs only when the
state attempts to introduce incriminating
statements at trial. 31 This last
32
opinion.
plurality
a
assertion created
compelled self-incrimination).
28

See Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2625-28. The court stated that Miranda was a rule that

swept beyond the actual protections of the Self Incrimination Clause, and an extension of
the rule can only be justified if its serves to protect the actual right against compelled selfincrimination. See id. at 2627. The Self-Incrimination Clause is not implicated by the
introduction of physical evidence. See id. at 2626 (citing United States v. Hubbell, 530
U.S. 27, 34 (2000)). The Court noted the use of the term witness in the Self-Incrimination
Clause limits protections regarding incriminating communications to those that are testimonial in character. Id.; see also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304 (1985) (noting Fifth
Amendment not concerned with non-testimonial evidence). The Court also stated that a
blanket rule suppressing physical evidence obtained as a result of a voluntary, unwarned
statement does not address either the goals of deterrence or ensuring trustworthy evidence
inherent in the Self-Incrimination Clause and Miranda. Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2628. The
deterrence rationale seeks to instill a greater degree of care in police with regards to a defendant's rights by rendering any coerced statement inadmissible and thereby removing the
incentive to utilize such techniques. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974). A
blanket suppression rule would serve to render evidence obtained from a voluntary, unwarned statement inadmissible, even in the absence of bad faith where the deterrence rationale would not have the same force. See id. Also, the Miranda presumption of coercion
in the absence of warnings does not require the statements and the fruits of the statements
be discarded as inherently tainted. Elstad,470 U.S. at 305.
29 See Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2628. The Self-Incrimination Clause, unlike the Fourth
Amendment, contains self-executing language, and provides automatic protection against
use of involuntary statements. Id. This specific textual protection creates a presumption
against expanding the Miranda rule to encompass the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine
utilized in instances of Fourth Amendment violations. Id.; see also supra note 18, 21 and
accompanying text (discussing fundamental differences between Fourth and Fifth Amendment).
30 Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2628. The Dickerson decision recognized the continuing
validity of the Miranda precedents including Elstad and Tucker. See id; see also supra
notes 21-22 and accompanying text (discussing confusion regarding Miranda precedents in
light of the Dickerson decision).
31 See Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2628-629 (Thomas, J., plurality opinion) (classifying Self
Incrimination Clause and Miranda rule as fundamental trial right). It follows that the police
do not violate the Self-Incrimination Clause and the Miranda rule by a mere negligent or
even deliberate failure to warn. Id. Potential violations only occur upon the admission of
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In an attempt to eliminate confusion regarding admissibility of
physical evidence obtained from an unwarned, voluntary statement, the
Court appears to have unnecessarily allowed the confusion to survive.33
Rather than compose a clear majority opinion stating that the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine should not apply to the fruits of an unwarned,
voluntary statement, the Court complicated the issue by focusing on
whether the failure to warn is a violation of the Miranda rule itself.34 The
concurring opinion agreed with the plurality's argument that admission of
physical evidence did not implicate the Self Incrimination Clause. Specifically, the admission of the glock would not serve to deter overzealous police practices or allow for the introduction of untrustworthy evidence.35
The plurality's unnecessary assertion, however, that a failure to warn did
not constitute a violation of the Miranda rule, and its subsequent substantial reliance on this assertion, may lead to confusion that it wished to
eliminate.36

The Miranda precedents of the Court were called into question because they relied, in part, on the classification of Miranda as a prophylactic
rule. 37 The unnecessary reliance on whether a failure to warn constitutes a
violation of Miranda could similarly call this holding into question if this
issue is further addressed by the Court. 38 It appears that the plurality adunwarned statements into evidence at trial. Id. The exclusion of these statements is a complete remedy for a Mirandaviolation. Id.
32 See Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2630-631 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (agreeing with plurality except holding it unnecessary to decide whether failure to warn is violation of Mirandain and of itself).
33 Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2624 (noting confusion regarding impact of Dickerson decision on the Miranda precedents); see also supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text (describing confusion and resulting Circuit split after Dickerson decision).
34 See Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2630-631 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (agreeing with plurality except holding it unnecessary to decide whether failure to warn is violation of Miranda in and of itself).
35 See supra note 26 and accompanying text (explaining rationale for allowing the
admission of physical evidence obtained from voluntary, unwarned statement); see also
Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2630-631 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (agreeing with plurality except holding it unnecessary to decide whether failure to warn is violation of Miranda
in and of itself).
36 See Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2629-630 (Thomas, J., plurality opinion) (noting
lack of
Miranda violation weakens any deterrence rationale for suppression of gun). The Court
apparently believed a strong deterrence argument could be made in favor of suppression if it
was found that the police had violated the defendant's constitutional rights. See id. at 2629
(Thomas, J., plurality opinion).
37 See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text (explaining belief that Court implicitly overruled Miranda precedents when Mirandarule determined to be constitutional rule
leading to Circuit split).
38 See Patane, 304 F.3d at 1029 (noting Dickerson holding of Miranda warnings as
constitutional rule fundamentally changed analysis of admission of physical fruits of

CASE COMMENT: 124 S. CT. 2620
dressed this issue to counter a deterrence argument in favor of suppression. 39 The plurality's assertion, however, that even a deliberate failure to
warn does not violate a defendant's constitutional rights seems to
strengthen the deterrence argument. 40 Ultimately, the interests in eliminating confusion would be better served by focusing strictly on the explicit
language of the Self-Incrimination Clause in securing a majority opinion
while avoiding the issue of4whether
a failure to warn constitutes a violation
1
of Miranda in and of itself.
In United States v. Patane, the Supreme Court considered whether
physical evidence obtained as a result of an unwarned, voluntary statement
should be inadmissible under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. The
Court correctly held that the introduction of this physical evidence did not
implicate the Self-Incrimination Clause, and that Miranda should not be
expanded to include the "poisonous fruit" doctrine unless it closely fit the
goal of protecting the actual right against self-incrimination. The Court's
assertion, however, that a failure to warn is not a violation of Miranda in
and of itself created a plurality opinion, and detracted from the Court's
goal in clearly answering this question. In fact, by substantially relying on
this non-majority assertion in its argument the Court may have left the door
open for future confusion and Circuit splits regarding this issue.
Sean Tirrell

Miranda violation); United States v. Faulkingham, 295 F.3d 85, 92-93 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting Dickerson holding of Miranda warning as constitutional rule strengthened argument
against admission of physical fruits of Miranda violation). A possible future holding classifying a failure to warn as a violation of Miranda could have similar consequences, allowing
courts to possibly view this decision as being overruled by implication. See id.
39 See Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2629-630 (Thomas, J., plurality opinion) (noting lack of
Miranda violation weakens any deterrence rationale for suppression of gun). The Court
apparently believed a strong deterrence argument could be made in favor of suppression if it
was found that the police had violated the defendant's constitutional rights. See id. at 2629
(Thomas, J., plurality opinion).
40 See Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2629 (Thomas, J., plurality opinion) (noting violation
occurs upon introduction of unwarned statements into evidence rather than the failure to
warn itself). It could be argued that this assertion could encourage police to intentionally
withhold warnings if they believe physical evidence would be forthcoming. See id. at 2632
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting this case is an invitation to law enforcement to flout
Miranda where physical evidence may be obtainable). This is the type of conduct Miranda
intended to deter. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445-55.
41 See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text (explaining potential problems of
plurality opinion and possible future confusion).

